EXCISE

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November 7, 1962

The Secretary

The Under Secretary

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: S/P - Walt W. Rostow FROM

SUBJECT: Strategy for a Post-Crisis Cuba

I enclose a draft paper on the main elements of a proposed US-OAS strategy toward a post-crisis (Stage II) Cuba which was called for by Mr. McGeorge Bundy late last week and which is scheduled for consideration by the Executive Committee of the NSC this afternoon at Mr. Johnson's suggestion.

Prepared under forced draft by Henry Ramsey, and concurred in by me, it has been refined today in close collaboration at the ARA working-level (Mr. Arturo Morales-Carrion, Mr. Crimmins, Mr. Hurwitch) but has not been seen by Mr. Martin. It should therefore be considered only a draft of suggested strategy which looks beyond Stage II but furnishes our negotiators strategic guidance for what the track should be beyond the immediate crisis.

Copies of this draft are being forwarded through Mr. Brubeck to other members of the Executive Committee of the NSC.

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November 7, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Strategy for a Post-Crisis Cuba

Attached is a Policy Planning Council draft of a proposed strategy for a post-crisis Cuba, as called for by Mr. McGeorge Bundy, and which we wanted to be available for this afternoon's meeting (at Mr. Johnson's suggestion). It has been refined in collaboration with the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs but has not been seen or approved by Mr. Martin.

W. W. Rostow

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### I. THE PROBLEM

Immediate minimum strategic objectives in the Cuban crisis are the dismantling, withdrawal and prevention of a subsequent build-up of offensive weapons systems under appropriate international verification procedures, including an acceptable form of ground inspection (Stages I and II as outlined to our negotiators at the UN). "Offensive weapons" should include the IL-28's, actual or potential base facilities for submarines with short-range rockets, as well as the missiles which provoked the crisis.

We have thus far focused on offensive weapons rather than on the future of Castro, though we have reassured the OAR's that the President's non-invasion pledge will not guarantee the Castro regime and that Castro's political and military ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc are not negotiable.

We cannot see clearly what will emerge beyond Stage II, since the Mikoyan negotiations and what we do or accept in effecting Stage II will affect the track beyond. It is likely



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that Mikoyan, in an effort to save Communism in Cuba will bargain offensive weapons other than missiles (e.g., IL-28's) and modalities of inspection for some expanded form of non-invasion commitment, or other guarantees, designed to shore-up the Castro regime and the Soviet presence. But regardless of Mikoyan's purposes, we must clarify our strategic objectives beyond Stage II in order to coordinate immediate negotiating problems with long-range strategy.

The problem is to examine the feasibility and risks of a maximal US strategy toward a post-crisis (Stage II) Cuba directed at the elimination (a) of the predominant Soviet presence and (b) of the Castro regime, including its old-line communist hardcore,

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### II. THE PRESENT SITUATION

Our strategy should be shaped from the following governing factors in the present situation:

1. A combination of conventional force and diplomacy forced Khrushcher to retreat to avoid a clash of conventional

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forces, in which he would have lost, and the possibility of escalation toward nuclear exchanges, in which he would also have lost. The same combination of forces which compelled the retreat is available to enforce our Stage II terms.

- 2. Soviet duplicity and Castro's dependence on Moscow are so firmly established, and the possibilities of clandestine build-ups of offensive weapons are sufficiently real, that we and the OAR's are justified in concluding that the Hemisphero will not be secure against the possibility of attack until the Soviets and Castro are eliminated from Cuba. Pending their elimination, we are justified in taking appropriate measures, under OAS doctrine, to safeguard against clandestine strategic build-ups or indirect aggression against the OAR's (inspection, serial surveillance, quarantine, and other measures to isolate Cuba).
- 3. The Soviets, the Castro regime, and the Latin American communists generally are in a state of disarry from which we should not permit them to recover. We have never possessed a greater opportunity of discrediting Soviets and communists alike throughout the Remisphere. Failure to press our accordance ecold

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could be interpreted by the Soviets and OAR's as a failure of leadership and will and a sign of weakness.

- 4. If we pursue this opportunity judiciously and resolutely, we can very probably count on the support of the OAR including though will need special attention. The OAR's are concerned lest the President's non-invasion pledge sustain Castro and they can be expected to cooperate in measures to contain indirect aggression and to safeguard against the further emplacement of offensive weapons. They can also be expected to support measures designed to weaken and further isolate Castro. Hemispheric solidarity behind American leadership is perhaps now even stronger than during World War II.
  - 5. Relations between Moscow and Havana are strained and can be further exacerbated. Opportunities to make Cuba more unprofitable to the Soviets, and more risky in terms of post-crisis prestige, exist.

Though there are limits to the loss of face we want to impose on Khrushchev, there are even sharper limits on the amount of fare we want to save, and on any loss he might impose


impose on us. We should not let Khrushchev or the world forget what he and his Cuban stooges tried to do to the US-OAS or conclude that his removal from the Hemisphere is too stiff a price to pay for his secretive strategem.

The amount of face we cause Castro to lose will bear directly on the security of his internal position and on his external influence.

- 6. Soviet behavior during recent months, Castro's oscillations with the communist apparatus, and the political and economic uncertainties flowing from US-OAS-Free World pressures will exert profound political effects on the Cubans in the months to come. Opportunities for resistance should arise in their wake: Splits in the leadership could occur as anti-Soulet Castroites and disenchanted Castroites move toward a purer expression of Cuban nationalism; organized oppositions to the regime at provincial and local levels could also develop. We should prepare now for such eventualities and influence their shape.
- 7. There is no basis for believing that Castro is tempermentally or morally capable of returning to the OAS fold and commitments

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commitments. With or without Soviet support, there is every belief that Castro would be a neighbor we could not trust.



### III. OPTIONS OPEN TO THE SOVIETS

The present crisis centers on four US-CAS complaints against the Castro regime which arise from its links to the internal local Communist movement:

- 1. It has permitted the Soviets to install offensive weapons
- 2. It is dependent -- economically, politically, militarily, on an extra-continental power which is committed to overthrow of the general system of values espoused throughout the OAR's.
  - 3. It has engaged in indirect against on against council take

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4. It is a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship which.

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confronts the American System with "ideological incompation bility".

The achievement of Stage II objectives will climinate only interest complaint and the Soviets or Castro can do little to satisfy the other complaints while Cuba remains Communist. Mikeyan's negative tiptions could substantially eliminate the second but this room questionable for face-saving ideological and bargaining respons

AND Soviet-Cuban guarantees with respect to complaints three and too would be credible

The Soviet options are essentially four.

- of "offensive weapons", should the Soviets decide to still on the IL-28's, submarine base facilities, and modalities of inspectation Tais option may, on the other hand, be used as a negotically pawn to drive the best US-OAS bargain possible for Castro and the Soviets. It is within our power to force the Soviets to abandon this option:
- 2. A new version of the status quo sale, in which offer sive weapons are removed under various as hoc verification procedures, but in which holds reanforces it commitment to

the Cuban revolution, seeks to maintain dominance over the revolution, and tries (possibly) to bargain for a maximum relaxation of Free World pressure on Cuba.

- 3. A Soviet-Cuban movement toward "neutralization" in which the Soviet presence would be phased down and Castro would be told to make the best terms he could with the Free World. This option might represent the long-range direction of option 2 in a Soviet reassessment of the present crisis or as a result of an increased isolation of Castro and Cuba.
- 4. A complete Soviet disengagement accompanied by negotiating efforts to save Castro and persuade the Free World to coexist with him. This appears unlikely.

Other options are even more remote. A more intimate SovietCastro relationship (adherence of Cuba to the Warsaw Pact or a
bilateral military pact and security guarantee) would, in the
wake of the quarantine and the President's non-invasion pledge
appear unnecessarily provocative and risky. Nor does it seem
credible that the Soviets would now jettison Castro into ChiCom
hands or permit a situation to develop whereby Castro disengaged


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from the Soviets and the communist apparatus in Cuba, even should Castro venture in this direction.

Some revisions of/2 or 3 are most likely to emerge from the interplay of Moscow and Havana, and it is to them to which US strategy should be mainly addressed, with the objective of moving the Soviets'toward option 4.

### IV. US STRATEGIC OPTIONS

A long-range strategy most compatible with the present hemispheric temper must be directed at removing the complaints which gave rise to the present crisis: We can normalize relations with a post-crisis Cuba only to the extent that the bases of complaints are relaxed.



A strategy designed to satisfy US and hemispheric interests should therefore combine:



L. Pressure

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- 1. Pressure to reduce and eliminate the Soviet presence in Cuba and its hold over Castro, since the OAR's find this incompatible with the American System, an unwarranted intervention in the internal affairs of an American state, and a continuing security threat.
- 2. Pressure short of invasion to eliminate the Castro regime, since the American public will continue to demand this, since Castro cannot be trusted to change his spots, and since the OAR's are now shocked at the extent to which Castro has conspired with the USSR to threaten their security. Even if a neutralized Cuba without Castro should eventuate as a half-way house, we should not prior to this eventuality in any way commit ourselves to guarantees for the Castro regime.
- 3. Continued post-crisis inspection (or pressure for it)
  and aerial surveillance within the letter of the October 23
  Resolution of the COAS/OC, since post-missile Cuba, in association with the USSR, will possess a residual military capability susceptible to clandestine supply.
- 4. Insistence that Cuban waters and harbors (bases) be closed to Soviet submarines or mayar vessels, since these

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could be equipped with short-range rockets or be clandentine conveyors of offensive weapons. (This problem could possibly be taken care of under the proposed Brazilian denuclearization resolution.)

5. Coordinated OAS appeals (and selective support) to the Cuban people, to Cuban dissidents and selected refugees, and to anti-Soviet Castroites:

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This self-reenforcing strategy cuts several ways in our interest:

Keeping the pressure and public eye on the Soviet presence by inspection, surveillance or quarantine, preferably with OAS support, will maintain the present measure of hemispheric solidarity and keep the focus of concern on the source of the Cuban crisis and the Hemisphere's underlying complaints against Castro. It undercuts Castro internally as one who is unduly dependent on a foreign power and isolated from his neighbors. Because of the interaction between the Soviet presence and Castro, it progressively allows Castro's position and prospects to deteriorate while compounding the costs, difficulties and

risks

risks involved in the Soviets' continuing to underwrite his regime.

This strategy should not be applied only as an antiCommunist strategy. It should be dovetailed with efforts to
accelerate the Alliance for Progress and to present it as the
only acceptable way to controlled social revolution within the
American System. It should keep the focus on the unacceptable
risks to the Hemisphere of a continued Soviet and Castro presence in Cuba and it should progressively equate the two so inextricably that it will be clear that when one goes the other
must follow

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
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The long-range political costs of withstanding these pressures, in terms of impingements on prestige and national sovereignty both to the DSSR and Cuba, might persuade the Soviets gradually to disengage, especially if internal economic conditions continued to deteriorate and resistance developed which the US-OAS could support.



3. Option 3: A neutralized Cuba. A "neutralized Cuba under Castro would be an filusion unless the Soviets were able to persuade the Free World to share Soviet subsidies to Cuba. It should be within our tactical resources to defeat the Soviets on this gambit while pushing them further along the disengagement track. In any negotiations instituted by the Soviets in the direction of neutralization, we should take firm tactical positions that (a) we would not guarantee a Castro regime in the long-term and (b) would not accept neutralization under Castro unless (i) the entire Soviet military presence departed and (ii) Cuba demilitarized. Castro obviously could not accept

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
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
the last condition for fear of encouraging resistance with which he could not cope: if he dic, it should make it much easier to bring him down from within short of military invasion.

4. Option 4: Soviet disengarement accompanied by negotiations to guarantee the Castro regime. A genuine Soviet disengagement would leave Castro economically prostrate but with considerable military reserves.





V. Timing



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### V. TIMING AND RISKS

The OAR's, important neutrals, and our allies would doubtless welcome the liquidation of the Soviet presence in Cuba and the Castro regime for the reasons that both offend OAS doctrine and heighten world tensions. This suggests that in Stage II we should negotiate positions which prepare the way for these strategic objectives.

Further, if the OAR's will go along with us (and all indications are that they will if we act while the Soviet threat and duplicity is at the front of their thinking), there could be advantages in informing the Soviets frankly that we will allow them a decent period of time to phase out and remove their technicians, but put them on notice that they will avoid further risks to their prestige by making a clean decision to observe the OAS restrictions on extra-continental presences in the Hemisphere.

The risks of this strategy should not be as great as those run by the quarantine. They could be minimized by a clear Soviet reading of the fact that the OAS and important European allies of the United States were determined to make the costs of a

continued

continued Soviet presence in Cuba as high as possible and that hovering over the entire investment of treasure and prestige was the possibility of a selective quarantine which could bring Castro to his knees.

Our rationale for continuing and progressive pressures might not be as dramatic or convincing as in the case of offensive weapons but a united or near-unanimous stand on the part of the OAS against an extra-continental presence which threatened the Homisphere once, and was guilty of gross duplicity, would go far in persuading world opinion to the proposition that the OAS under international law is prepared to take further appropriate measures such as progressive quarantine and inspection measures wounted to safeguard its security and self-peiense.

### VI. PARTIAL SCENARIO OF PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL MOVES

1. Stand firm for ground inspection, continued serial surveillance and the elimination of IL-25's and the possibility of submarine bases in Cuban waters; and reserve full freedom of action to return to the October 27 status unless all offensive weapons as defined by us are withdrean under acceptable

international

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international verification, and suitable safeguards are established to prevent further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

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- 3. Press at an appropriate time for OAS resolutions which will, vis-a-vis a post-missile Cuba advance general positions along these lines:
- a. Declare a continued Soviet presence in support of the Castro regime incompatible with OAS doctrine and the American System.
- b. Call upon Castro (within a reasonable time-limit) to liquidate the Soviet presence in Cuba and permit self-determination within Cuba upon penalty of severance of diplomatic and economic ties with those OAR's which now maintain relations and trade with Cuba, and denial of transit or over-flight privileges for Soviet aircraft.
- c. Reserve, as now provided within the UN Charter and OAS doctrine, the right of individual and collective self-defense against threats posed by Guba.

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4. Prepare capabilities and courses of action,



- 5. It Cuba continues as a simmering crisis area with Soviet-Cuban behavior continuing to threaten vital US and hemispheric interests, consider at an appropriate time informing the Soviets that we will give them a respectable time to liquidate their presence and, if they do not, that we will reserve the right to institute a selective quarantine of shipping to enforce the OAS resolutions.
- 6. Devise selective courses of action to implement this general strategy with as wide a measure of support as can be obtained from Free World nations.
- 7. Coordinate this general strategy with a parallel strategy to move the Alliance for Progress forward in the wake of the Cuban crisis.
- 8. Prepare plans for US (and OAS) political and economic activities in Cuba after Soviet disengagement and the removal of Castro.

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### THE PROBLEM

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## II THE PRESENT SITUATION

Our strategy should be shaped from the following government factors in the present situation:

1. A combination of conventional force and diplomed forced Khrushchev to retreat to avoid a clash of conver in



forces, in which he would have lost, and the possibility of escalation toward nuclear exchanges, in which he would also have lost. The same combination of forces which compelled to retreat is available to enforce our Stage II terms.

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- A complete Soviet disengagement accompanied by negotiating efforts to save Castro and persuade the Free World to coexist with him. This appears unlikely.

Other options are even more remote. A more intimate Some Castro relationship (adherence of Cuba to the Warsaw Pact or bilateral military pact and security guarantee) would, in the wake of the quarantine and the President's non-invasion place appear unnecessarily provocative and risky. Nor does it seem credible that the Soviets would now jettleon Castro into Chicae hands or permit a situation to develop whereby Castro disent

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
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### V. TIMING AND RISKS

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of the OAS against an extra continuing and progressive pressure with not be as drawatic or convincing as in the case sive weapons but a united or near-unanimous stand on the of the OAS against an extra continental pressure which the the Kanaphore and and was guilty of gross cup, would so far in persuading world opinion to the proposition that the OAS under international law is prepared to be appropriate measures such as progressive quareating and the tipu measures and tipu mea

## VI. PARTIAL ECENARIO OF PRISHESSIVE POLITICAL MARE

surveillance and the establishmental of the Park the solution to salar to the salar the salar to salar the sala

international verification, and suitable safeguards are established to prevent further introduction of such weathers systems into Cuba.

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along these lines:

3. Press at an appropriate time for CAS resolutions will, vis-a-vis a post-missile Cuba advance general position.

a. Declare a continued Soviet presence in support of the Castro regime incompactors with day noctrine and the continued System.

to liquidate the Soviet presence in Substant permit seld determination within Substantant promity of assertance of the lowest and economic time with those was a south now to relations one crade with Caps, and aparal of transit in filight privileges included and transit and relations one crade with Caps, and aparal of transit in

and Oad ductring, the start of the Evident and the State of the delease against threats moved by Cuba

4, Prepare capabilities and courses of action

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- 5. In Cuba continues as a simmering crisis area with soviet-Cuban behavior continuing to threaten vital US and in the pheric interests, consider at an appropriate time information. Soviets that we will give them a respectable time to liquit their presence and, if they do not, that we will reserve their presence and, if they do not, that we will reserve the OAS resolutions.
  - 6. Devise selective courses of action to implement the general strategy with as wide a measure of support as can obtained from Free World nations.
  - 7. Coordinate chis general strategy with a paradich strategy to move the Alilance for Progress forward in the coordinate chis.
  - 8. Prepare plans for US (and OAS) political and constant activities in Cuba after Soviet disengagement and the constant of Castro.

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